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Abstract
We employ a discrete choice experiment to elicit demand and supply side prefer-
ences for insurance-linked credit, a promising market-based tool for managing
agricultural weather risks and providing access to credit for farmers. We estimate
preference heterogeneity using primary data from smallholder farmers and man-
agers of lenders/insurers combined with household socio-economic survey data in
Kenya. We analyse the choice data using maximum simulated likelihood and Hier-
archical Bayes estimation of a mixed logit model. Although there are some similar-
ities, we find that there is conflicting demand and supply side preferences for credit
terms, collateral requirements, and loan use flexibility. We also analyse willingness
to buy and willingness to offer for farmers and suppliers, respectively, for the risk
premium for different attributes and their levels. Identifying the preferred attri-
butes and levels for both farmers and financial institutions can guide optimal pack-
aging of insurance and credit providing market participation and adoption
motivation for insurance-bundled credit product.
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1. Introduction
Uninsured agricultural risk and limited access to credit are important issues in agricul-
tural development and are considered among the sources of poverty traps in sub-
Saharan Africa (Barrett et al., 2006; Barrett and Carter, 2013; Santos and Barrett,
2019). Agricultural production is affected by drought-related climate risks which are
increasing in frequency and severity in the region (Daryanto et al., 2016; Lesk et al.,
2016). Agricultural productivity is also affected by limited access to capital that inhi-
bits smallholder farmers’ ability to purchase and optimise agricultural inputs. The
impacts of drought-related climate risks are particularly acute in Kenya. According to
the Government of Kenya, four consecutive years (2008–2011) of drought amounted
to US$12.1 billion in losses, including losses in assets and from disruptions in the eco-
nomic flow across all sectors (GOK, 2014). Government and donor communities
alone cannot finance severe shocks such as these, and efforts are underway to secure
market-oriented private sector interventions. A promising intervention, and one
which forms the backdrop to this paper, is insurance-bundled credit product which
links insurance directly to agricultural credit to protect both borrower and lender
against specified contingent risks (Skees and Barnett, 2006; Skees et al., 2007; Giné
and Yang, 2009; Carter et al., 2011; Collier et al., 2011; Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega,
2011; Shee and Turvey, 2012; Farrin and Miranda, 2015; Shee et al., 2015; Carter
et al., 2016).
While theoretically appealing, little is known about the preferred attributes of
insurance-linked credit products. To scale up insurance-linked credit products, their
attributes become important determinants not only in defining utility-maximising
choices but also in the design and marketing of the underlying insurance attributes
and how these relate to credit demand. Understanding preferences for and implicit
prices of the different attributes of insurance-linked credit products can provide use-
ful policy information for practitioners and decision-makers in the market. Equally
important are the supply-side attributes and the preferences placed on linked-credit
by bankers and insurers. Indeed, the prevailing literature on the lender-borrower
relationship shows that, in many respects, there is a gap in expectations and under-
standing between demand and supply factors. Thus, heterogeneous choice in bun-
dled-credit exists not only within borrower and lender groups but also between
them. In other words, a supply-demand equilibrium in an insurance-linked credit
market requires not only alignment in the costs of credit and insurance, but also the
specific attributes of credit, including the nature and type of insurance, the term of
credit, and collateral requirements. We address this equilibrium specifically by inves-
tigating the willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-offer (WTO) from identical
in-the-field choice experiments applied to both borrowers (smallholder farmers) and
financial providers (lenders and insurers) in the drought-prone Machakos County in
Kenya.
A problem in understanding credit demand is that empirical measurements from
survey data in the short run are unresponsive to interest rate changes since, by and
large, most farmers receive the same interest rate or a range of rates over a small inter-
val. The statistical results might then indicate that demand is highly inelastic (the vari-
ance in loan amounts exceeds the variance in interest rates). Likewise, it is difficult to
infer the effective credit supply by the finance providers. Consequently, economists
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and practitioners have turned to randomised control and other experimental methods,
though these studies are rather limited.1 Even rarer are singular studies that use in-
the-field experimental techniques to examine both demand and supply stakeholders at
the same time, using the same instrument. Recent studies have estimated farmers’
preferences and willingness to pay for particular attributes of insurance (Fraser, 1992;
Wang et al., 1998; Akter et al., 2009, 2016; Hill et al., 2013; Liesivaara and Myyrä,
2014; Gallenstein et al., 2019), and choice experiments have found broad application
in estimating consumer preferences in the non-insurance literature (e.g. Lusk et al.,
2003, 2006; Basu and Hicks, 2008; Ortega et al., 2012; Ward et al., 2014, 2016; Ward
and Makhija, 2018). However, none have investigated preference heterogeneity in
both demand and supply side of an insurance-linked credit product as we do here. We
use stated preference discrete choice experiments in the field to analyse how farmers
and finance providers respond to different attributes and levels for insurance-linked
credit. Since observational data with any variation in the contractual design of insur-
ance-linked credit are not available, we exploit the choice experiment approach to eli-
cit preferences for product attributes that are difficult to observe in the market.
Our field choice experiments with attributes of a risk-contingent credit (RCC) pro-
duct was first piloted with farmers in a randomised control trial (RCT) in the Macha-
kos County of Kenya in the long rain season of 2017/2018.2 Our choice experiment
was implemented independently of the RCT, but our 330 demand respondents were
randomly selected from the initial 1,170 Kenyan farmers included in the RCT. On the
supply side, we also met concurrently with 39 supply-side stakeholders drawn from
commercial banks and insurers. This sample was drawn from agricultural lenders at
the local bank and insurance companies that offered RCC to farmers for the RCT. In
addition, we met with agricultural lenders from competing banks and MFIs in and
around Nairobi, as well as villages and townships throughout the Machakos County.
The implementing details are provided below, but it is important to emphasise that
with this experimental design we can investigate heterogeneous choice amongst both
borrowers and lenders/stakeholders over the same set of attributes – an experimental
protocol that we have yet to find elsewhere in the literature.
The lender-borrower relationship is fraught with multiple tensions. The greater ten-
sion is the demand-driven willingness to pay (WTP, cost minimisation) and the sup-
ply-driven willingness to offer (WTO, profit maximisation) a loan product. But in
terms of risk mitigation, there are also economic tensions in collateral requirements,
insurance coverage, and cost of insurance. Our approach of offering identical experi-
mental choices to both demand and supply-side stakeholders allows us to distinguish
the weighting that each place on different attributes. The extent of heterogeneity
among the farmers and financial institutions may have implications for implementa-
tion strategy and policy because it implies that individuals will not respond uniformly
to economic incentives.
The next section provides a brief review of the literature and study background of
risk-contingent credit. Section 3 describes the design of our discrete choice experiment
and the econometric framework for estimating demand and supply-side preferences
1See, for example, Turvey et al. (2012), Banerjee and Duflo (2014), Karlan et al. (2014), Baner-
jee et al. (2015), Bogan et al. (2015), Cao et al. (2016).
2The specifics of the RCT, its outcomes and impacts, are to be presented in follow-on papers
that are being prepared contemporaneously.
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and heterogeneity in these preferences for RCC. Our primary data and results of
empirical analysis including interpretations are presented in section 4. Section 5 con-
cludes with some economic implications.
2. Bundling Insurance with Credit – Literature and Study Background
Over the past two decades, index-insurance has gained some success around the world
for managing agricultural risks faced by farmers, but is mostly hampered by low
demand (for recent reviews, see Miranda and Farrin, 2012; Marr et al., 2016; Cole
and Xiong, 2017; Jensen and Barrett, 2017; and the critique by Binswanger-Mkhize,
2012). Attention among economists and practitioners has now turned to new
approaches to the bundling of index insurance with smallholder agricultural credit, to
manage drought-related climate risk faced by farmers and reduce default risk faced by
lenders. Unlike traditional credit products, insurance-linked credit facilitates risk
management by including hedging protection into loan payment obligations. When a
weather index such as rainfall level worsens and crosses a predetermined trigger, the
insurance pays out thus reducing the farmers’ repayment burden. With the removal of
critical liquidity constraints, combined with the inter-temporal transfer of climate risk,
bundling insurance with credit mechanism can achieve better targeting of poorer
farmers, increase economic efficiency, provide climate resilience, reduce income
inequality, and eliminate weather-based poverty traps.
Consequently, there has been an emerging literature on insurance-linked credit in
developing countries. Giné and Yang (2009) investigated the adoption of an operating
loan in Malawi, where the payoff was determined by rainfall, and found low take-up.
Karlan et al. (2011) investigated the adoption of price-contingent credit in Ghana and
found a limited uptake. Carter et al. (2011) examined the impacts of RCC on financial
market deepening and its impacts on farm households, concluding that RCC capi-
talised the adoption of new technology. Shee and Turvey (2012) showed how risk-con-
tingent instruments can be priced in practice and, using simulated field data, they
concluded that an imbedded price option for pulse crops in India provided downside
risk protection for pulse farmers. Shee et al. (2015) conducted a field-based feasibility
of RCC with Kenyan pastoralists and dairy farmers. Casaburi and Willis (2018) imple-
mented insurance-linked contract farming and found a 72% take-up rate. These papers
investigate bundled products where agricultural risks are linked to loans directly made
to farmers or agribusiness. Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega (2011) and Collier et al. (2011)
provide conceptual frameworks in which financial institutions themselves link their
loan portfolios to El Niño risks in Central America. In addition to our own RCT, other
implementation projects on bundled credit can be found in the agricultural insurance
scheme in India where weather-based crop insurance is bundled with agricultural loans
taken from commercial banks and the Planet Guarantee project in Burkina Faso where
index insurance is bundled with credit for maize and cotton farmers.
In a typical market for credit, the demand for agricultural credit is not necessarily a
direct demand, but an indirect demand derived from the demand for inputs (Shee and
Turvey, 2012). The derived demand for credit is dependent upon the liquidity available
to the farm household in terms of savings and the liquidity provided by accessing credit
(Barry et al., 1981). This derived demand and the demand for liquidity above savings
and ready cash may influence farmers’ willingness to pay an interest rate premium.
However, increased use of debt comes with an increased probability of default. The len-
der’s response to this risk is to impose collateral requirements (Barry et al., 1981;
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Binswanger and Sillers, 1983; Bester, 1985; Bhattacharyya, 2005; Shee and Turvey,
2012). Bester (1985) has argued that higher interest rates can substitute for collateral.
The relationship between interest rates and collateral is important for understanding the
demand for credit. Mathematically, the inverse relationship between interest rates and
collateral assumes that they are substitutes. However, in reality, this may not be correct.
Increasing evidence of risk rationing behaviour (Boucher et al., 2008, 2009; Verteramo-
Chiu et al., 2014) can be quite significant and adds a complicating dimension to the
problem that significant numbers of farmers will reduce borrowing, or not borrow at all
if production (or consumption) assets are put at risk.
The introduction of insurance with credit can affect both the supply and demand
for credit. Karlan et al. (2014) find that relaxing credit constraints without mitigating
uninsured risk is not effective for agricultural development. On the supply side, the
presence of insurance against agricultural perils should encourage supply, shifting the
supply curve outwards with more loan offerings at lower interest rates. Likewise, in
the presence of insurance, and with insurance being a substitute for collateral, demand
should also be encouraged. The effect of insured credit might also reduce lender incen-
tives to impose harsh collateral requirements (Shee and Turvey, 2012) and other forms
of non-price rationing that will then induce risk-rationed farmers to enter the credit
market and encourage greater borrowing from non-risk-rationed farmers. This is con-
sistent with a crucial argument in Boucher et al. (2008) that the presence of insurance
should eliminate risk-rationing behaviour.
Our study is based on an existing project that implements RCC with Kenyan small-
holder farmers to manage their drought-related climate risk and to provide them with
access to credit. In the fall of 2017, our research group piloted RCC for the first time in
Machakos County in Kenya, with loan indemnities linked to long and short rains. The
implementation design was a randomised control experiment including no-loan, tradi-
tional loan, and risk contingent credit, with a sub-experiment, also randomised, on
RCC premium subsidisation. Uptake of offered traditional and RCC loans was about
40%. In time, our group will evaluate the impact on agricultural productivity, house-
hold income, consumption smoothing, savings and investment, household nutrition,
and so on, using traditional credit versus RCC against the no-credit counterfactual.
Figure S1 shows our study area in Machakos consisting of five sub-counties in
Machakos where RCC operation is ongoing in 13 locations. This is a semi-arid and
hilly terrain area that receives a very low annual rainfall of around 700 mm per year
with average rainfall in the long and short rain seasons being 315 and 266 mm, respec-
tively (GOK, 2014). It has experienced severe rainfall deficit (major drought) about
every decade and slight to moderate rainfall deficits (minor droughts) once every 3–-
4 years (GOK, 2014). Due to this semi-arid climate, smallholder farmers’ main food
crop is maize.
3. Empirical Methodology
We use stated preference discrete choice experiments (CE) to estimate demand and
supply-side preferences for different components of an insurance-linked credit prod-
uct. The theoretical underpinning of CE is rooted in the Lancastrian approach to util-
ity where individuals derive their utilities from a good through each of its attributes
(Lancaster, 1966). In our context, the good is the insurance-linked credit product,
which can be viewed as a collection of attributes such as cost and coverage of risk,
credit term, collateral requirement, and loan repayment flexibility. To understand
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preferences for and implicit prices of different attributes, it is appropriate to view the
demand and supply decisions as components of a utility maximisation problem, where
the utility is maximised by choosing a combination of attributes among a set of feasi-
ble alternatives (McFadden, 1974). To econometrically estimate marginal preferences
for the various attributes we design a discrete CE and collect data characterising par-
ticipants’ choices and their attributes.
Adamowicz et al. (1998), Carlsson and Martinsson (2001), and Lusk and Schroeder
(2004) have documented the advantages of using stated CE over revealed preference
methods and found no statistically significant difference between results from both the
approaches. Since the objective of this paper is to estimate marginal values for various
attributes of bundled credit products from both demand and supply sides with com-
mon attributes affecting non-monetary choices, we use a stated CE approach.
3.1. Design of our discrete choice experiment
Framing of choice experiments is critical. Our experiments were designed after years
of study in Kenya discussing the ideas behind RCC with farmers and related stake-
holders, including our implementation partners. These efforts have been documented
in Shee et al. (2015), Shee et al. (2019) and Turvey et al. (2019). Furthermore, we initi-
ated an RCT involving 1,170 farmers in Machakos County in 2017, with implementa-
tion continuing in 2019 in Machakos, and a non-RCT commercial trial being
implemented by a second Kenyan bank in a neighbouring county. Our sample of 330
farmers was randomly drawn from the initial RCT participants in Machakos, for
which we had data from the 2017 baseline survey. Thus, in terms of framing the exper-
iment, not only was our research team well versed in credit conditions in Machakos,
but also the participants were aware of, and some actually experienced RCC (Shee
et al., 2019). Likewise, on the supply side, our team had been meeting with stakehold-
ers regularly since 2016. Our stakeholder participants on the credit supply side were
drawn from organisation staff from lenders and insurers in the area. These stakehold-
ers were either familiar with our efforts or directly involved in implementation. As
might be expected in the course of running in-field experiments, the aggregate num-
bers of supply-side stakeholders from which to draw were limited. Ultimately, we
drew 39 supply-side respondents from a small (but unknown) pool.
The attributes and their levels selected for the CE were based on our interactions
with farmers and stakeholders in the field as outlined above, including farmers’ opin-
ion in focus group discussions, meetings with bank and insurance company managers,
consulting the scientific design team, and baseline survey results. Through this process
we identified nine attributes for our choice experiment: (1) insurance cost; (2) insur-
ance payment; (3) insured risk coverage; (4) credit term; (5) collateral requirement; (6)
loan repayment flexibility; (7) loan use flexibility; (8) preferred season for a loan; and
(9) rainfall measurement. A summary of the choice experiment attributes, and their
corresponding levels is presented in Table 1.
Given that the product is a bundled credit product, the attributes were designed to
capture both the insurance and the credit aspects. The first three attributes relate to
the insurance part which derives the willingness to pay for traditional insurance attri-
butes, including the cost of the RCC, the coverage level with respect to the underlying
rainfall risk, and how the insurance was to be paid. On this latter point, there was
some discussion amongst stakeholders as to whether farmers should pay for the insur-
ance separately from the credit, or whether the insurance cost should be added to the
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credit, with interest being paid on the whole. The base interest rate of 14% was used
in credit calculations for all farmers whether they were selected under the RCT for
standard credit or for RCC. Thus, the critical aspect at the margin is the premium
cost. We ranged the premium cost from 5% to 30%. The actuarial rate was 13% but
there were additional insurance loading costs (25%) and administrative charges. The
effective insurance premium was approximately 17% with all costs accounted for. In
our RCT, a subset of 100 farmers was randomly selected to receive a subsidy ranging
from 25% to 100% of the insurance premium. Those results showed that the demand
was in fact highly inelastic for RCC. The premium attribute provides a basis to deter-
mine whether the demand for RCC faces an inelastic or more elastic demand. In our
RCT, we measured risk in terms of cumulative rainfall within a season, and the risk
coverage offered was approximately 1 in 5 years. However, in the insurance design,
there was much debate as to whether the insurance should cover more frequent events
at a higher cost, or rarer events at significantly lower costs. The insured risk coverage
attribute covers the range of risk discussed with stakeholders. Also, in the design pro-
cess, there was discussion as to whether the risk should be based on long rains, short
rains, or both (ultimately the RCT made loans only for the long rains). That’s why we
included ‘preferred season for loan’ as an attribute in the CE. We also discussed how
rainfall should be measured. The options included measuring risk according to the
cumulative rainfall measure within the season, against a rainfall distribution approach
which has been proposed by some scholars.3
Table 1
Choice experiment attributes and corresponding levels
Attributes Levels
Insurance cost for borrowing
10,000 KSH loan
500 KSH (5%); 1,000 KSH (10%); 2,000 KSH (20%);
3,000 KSH (30%)
Insurance payment Premium added to the loan; Pay premium separately
Insured risk coverage Low coverage (covering rare risk, 1 in 20 years);
Medium coverage (covering medium risk, 1 in
10 years); High coverage (covering frequent risk, 1 in
4 years)
Credit term (length of loan) Short (up to 6 months, e.g. until harvest); Medium
(6 months to 1 year); Long (more than 1 year)
Collateral requirements No collateral required; Partial collateral required; Full
collateral required
Flexibility in loan repayment Make monthly repayments; Repay at time of harvest
only
Flexibility in loan use The loan can be used for any purpose; Loan can only be
used in agricultural production
Preferred season for loan Long rain; Short rain; Both
Rainfall measurement based
on
Total rainfall shortage for a season; Rainfall shortage
measured at various stages of the crop growth cycle
(vegetative, reproductive, and ripening stages)
3Ultimately the RCT in 2017 used the cumulative rainfall measure as described in Shee et al.
(2019), but the 2019 implementation is based on a multiple event, phenological approach as
described in Turvey et al. (2019).
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The remaining attributes capture characteristics associated with the loan. Shee and
Turvey (2012) hypothesised RCC as a pathway towards collateral-free loans as pro-
posed in Bester (1985). In reality, however, while credit risk is most aligned with fail-
ures in the long and short rains, there is still significant exposure to other risks
including pests, disease, flooding, and moral hazard (e.g. voluntary default). So, in
practice, RCC could never be collateral-free. From our baseline survey, we deter-
mined that 42% of farmers were risk rationed (Shee et al., 2019), suggesting that col-
lateral requirements could be a great barrier to loan demand, even if the most
significant risk was protected. The collateral attribute was designed to capture this
effect. There were also questions on how the loan could be used. If the loans were to
be used for purposes other than agricultural production, repayment would have to
come from sources other than agriculture. However, in focus groups, farmers indi-
cated a significant demand for credit for other uses. Finally, loan repayment was con-
sidered either on a monthly basis or after harvest. This latter option was encouraged
by the findings of Weber and Mußhoff (2013) who explored ‘flex loans’ (repaid after
harvest) in Madagascar. This is also consistent with the principle of liquidity match-
ing. Ultimately our RCT restricted credit use to agricultural use by issuing vouchers
to local Machakos suppliers, with a ‘flex’ repayment schedule.
3.1.1. D-optimal choice set design
To construct the choice sets, we specified the D-Optimality criterion using a modified
Federov search algorithm, based on calculating the determinant of the variance-co-
variance matrix of the parameters from a non-linear logit model. Choice sets were
constructed with three alternatives available for respondents. We did not include an
opt-out alternative in the choice sets.4 Our choice set design consisted of 54 unique
choice sets, which were assigned to 6 different blocks, such that each respondent was
required to respond to 9 choice sets with unique levels of attributes. The D-efficiency
4The literature is mixed on whether an opt-out option should be included. Excluding an opt-out
option has some advantages and disadvantages. In our instance, we had strong a priori evidence
that all participants had a demand for RCC, was more than a hypothetical and was contained
within their choice set. This is quite different than the use of opt-out (for example, Basu and
Hicks, 2008) in a fair-trade coffee experiment in which it is unknown if the opt-out is due to par-
ticular attributes or whether the cohort simply did not like coffee. Ready et al. (2010) argued
that the opt-out provides a means to determine the likelihood of purchase as well as estimates
of marginal WTP, whereas excluding an opt-out provides only estimates of marginal WTP.
Veldwijk et al. (2014) pointed out that including an opt-out option may automatically imply
reduced effectiveness as there would be more answering categories. Veldwijk et al. (2014) empir-
ically tested the effect of including an opt-out option in discrete choice experiments on partici-
pants’ choice behaviour and found that respondents’ education level and the location of the
opt-out option made a very small difference in behaviour between with and without opt-out
choice models. On balance, our decision to exclude an opt-out was predicated on the observa-
tion that our farmers had already indicated their demand for RCC relative to the status quo, so
the likelihood of opting out due to no demand was very small. By the same token, excluding the
opt-out in the supplier experiment was warranted, since, at the time of the experiment, the len-
der/insurers suppliers had already committed to supplying. Ultimately, the motivation of our
choice experiment was to estimate the demand and supply side preferences for specific attributes
of an RCC product. Including an opt-out option in these circumstances complicates the choice
for our participants, and risks not learning anything for our specific purposes, since it would
not provide any insight into attribute-level tradeoffs.
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of our choice set design was approximately 96%. However, to achieve the efficiencies
in choice experiments, consideration needs to be given to sample size. For the main
effect logit model, we estimate the number of parameters we needed to estimate was:




the number of attributes, and Li is the number of levels of attribute i.
Based on the experimental design we needed at least 24 − 9 + 1 = 16 parameters to
estimate. However, consideration of two interaction effects increased the number of
parameters required for efficient estimation. As proposed by Orme (1998), Johnson
and Orme (2003) and Rose and Bliemer (2013), a common rule of thumb for an esti-





, where S is the number of choice tasks presented to each respondent (9,
in our case), J is the number of alternatives per choice task (3 in our case), and l∗ is
the largest number of levels of any of the attributes (4, for insurance cost). The values
of S and J can be determined exogenously but should satisfy the rank condition, S
(J − 1) > K, where K is the number of parameters to be estimated. Estimating only
the main effects can lower the values for S and J, but this precludes any consideration
of correlated or heterogeneous preferences. To satisfy the rank condition we elected a
protocol with three alternatives per choice set, and with each respondent responding
to nine choice sets. We also considered two-factor interaction effects in addition to the
main effects which satisfied rank condition. As a consequence, we need at least 75
individuals in our sample. Given the nature of the block design, our sample included
330 farmers and 39 lender stakeholders. These 39 supply-side stakeholders fall short
of the 75 required for efficient estimation. As previously discussed, we are unsure if
the actual number of professionals in the Machakos region even approaches 75 mem-
bers. Even though the sample size for insurance and credit providers was low (because
there are only a finite number of managers to choose from) our D-optimal choice set
design should provide reliable parameter estimates at a smaller sample size (Yu et al.,
2009; Bliemer and Rose, 2010).
To ensure data reliability, we placed special emphasis on increasing farmers’ under-
standing of and involvement in tasks. Thus, we included pictorial illustrations of the
product attributes and their levels in the choice cards to facilitate respondents’ choice
tasks (see an example of a choice card presented to participants in Figure S2). To
reduce the response burden and fatigue on the participating households we grouped
the choices sets into six groups of nine choice sets each. The households were then
randomly assigned to the choice sets presented in one of the six groups, with an equal
proportion of households allocated to each of the groups. Since we have nine attri-
butes, a full profile design may lead to cognitive burden and response fatigue. To
overcome this problem, we use partial profile designs (e.g. Kessels et al., 2014) allow-
ing only five variables to vary on any one card. Nonetheless, we observed no evidence
of response fatigue but observed quite the opposite with many farmers eagerly
engaged and willing to talk about their farming operations with our surveyors.
3.1.2. Sampling and data collection
Figure 1 shows a schematic summary of the sampling design. A total of 1,170 house-
holds were randomly selected from 13 locations in 5 sub-counties of Machakos in
April–June 2017 and a baseline household survey was conducted simultaneously. The
sample households were provided with two phases of training: financial literacy
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training by Equity Bank and risk-contingent credit training by the research team.
After the training, a public lottery was conducted at each location to randomly divide
the sample households into three groups: traditional credit (treatment 1; 350 house-
holds), RCC (treatment 2; 350 households), or control (no credit; 350 households).
An additional 100 households were part of a sub-experiment for RCC demand estima-
tion. After these lotteries, farmers were given 2 weeks to decide whether to apply for a
loan. In October 2017 the first loan disbursements were completed by Equity Bank.
For the period of September 2017 to May 2018, the households were monitored for
loan repayment. As part of the RCC contract improvement and scaling up effort, the
research team conducted the choice experiments reported in this paper in June and
Random sample selection and baseline household 
survey with 1170 households
Financial training to all baseline farmers given by 
Equity Bank 
Training by research team on risk-contingent credit 
(RCC) including pictorial games to facilitate farmers’ 
understanding










RCC loan, 100 
HH-sub-exp
Jul-Aug 2017
Jun-Jul 2018Choice experiments (CE) conducted by project research 
team with 330 farmers and 39 managers from key 
insurance companies and banks in Kenya (managers 
participated in a centralized meeting in Nairobi where 









Figure 1. Experimental design
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July 2018 with 330 farm households (randomly selected from all three RCT groups)
and 39 managers from key insurance companies and banks in Kenya. All farmers
were members of the RCT and were familiar with RCC. Participating managers were
drawn from two sources: the first source was a centralised meeting in Nairobi where
RCC product was presented in detail by team leaders. The second group was oppor-
tunistically drawn, with team leaders visiting bank and insurance offices in townships
in areas in which the choice experiments were being held.
3.2. Econometric framework
Since the data from stated preference CEs are discrete choice decisions, they can be
analysed within a random utility framework (McFadden, 1974). Suppose that individ-
ual n faces J alternatives contained in a choice set (t). We define an underlying latent
variable unj that denotes the indirect utility associated with individual n choosing
alternative j∈J. Random utility maximisation implies that individual n will choose
alternative i if and only if uni>unj8j≠i. Following standard practice, we assume that
indirect utility is linear and can be written as:
unjt ¼ x0njtβnþ ɛnjt (1)
where x0njt is a vector of attributes for the j th alternative, β is a vector of preference
parameters, and ɛnjt is a stochastic component of utility that is independently and
identically distributed across individuals and alternatives. Assuming that ɛnj follows a
Gumbel (extreme value type I) distribution, the probability that individual n will










which can be estimated using maximum likelihood. However, a drawback of the
multinomial logit model is its imposition of a proportionate substitution pattern (also
called independence from irrelevant alternatives or IIA) and its inability to handle
random test variations. To overcome these limitations the literature suggests a gener-
alised random parameter logit model or the mixed logit model. An advantage of the
mixed logit model is that it is highly flexible and can approximate any random utility
model. This overcomes the limitations of multinomial logit by allowing random test
variation and observing substitution patterns from the data (McFadden and Train,
2000). In our context, since the random drawing of smallholder farmers was designed
to avoid uniformity and homogeneity, their ‘demand’ preferences for RCC attributes
may also be heterogeneous. As previously discussed, a random drawing of a subset of
managers from financial institutions would have been fruitless since the sample was so
small. Our approach was to get as broad a representation as possible. Since our repre-
sentative sample was heterogeneous by design – lender versus insurers, urban versus
rural – their ‘supply’ preferences for RCC attributes are also likely to be heteroge-
neous. If the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ samples show greater uniformity and homogene-
ity in their respective preferences, then the mixed logit model converges to the same
solution as the conditional logit model.
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Within the discrete choice literature, the preference heterogeneity can be estimated
through several approaches such as maximum simulated likelihood and Bayesian
methods to estimating the mixed logit model. This discussion draws heavily from
Train and Sonnier (2005), Hole (2007) and Train (2009). The researcher specifies a dis-
tribution for βn, fðβjθÞ where θ are the parameters of the distribution which has a
mean vector, b, and covariance matrix S, βn ∼Nðb,SÞ. The unconditional probability
of the observed sequence of choices is the conditional probability integrated over the










The integral in (3) does not have a closed-form solution and the above probability
(also called mixed logit probability) can be estimated using maximum simulated likeli-
hood approach, where we can approximate the probability by drawing from the den-
sity fðβjθÞ. Following Train (2009) the steps are as follows: (1) we take a draw of βn
from fðβjθÞ; (2) we calculate the conditional logit probability; and (3) we repeat this
calculation many times and average over the results. Finally, the simulated log-likeli-
hood (SLL) is calculated by summing the log of simulated probabilities over all indi-
viduals and the estimates of b and S are calculated by maximising the SLL (Train,
2009).
Another approach of estimating the individual level heterogeneity is the use of the
Hierarchical Bayes estimation procedure to the mixed logit model (Bayesian mixed
logit). Bayesian procedures overcome two prominent difficulties associated with classi-
cal procedures: (1) the Bayesian procedure does not require maximisation of a likeli-
hood function which may at times fail to converge; and (2) more desirable estimation
properties, such as consistency and efficiency can be attained under more relaxed con-
ditions (Train, 2009). Following Train (2009) the prior beliefs about b and S are speci-
fied as b∼Nð0,vÞ, v is large, and S∼ IGðv,1Þ for v! 1, where IG stands for inverted
Gamma distribution. The parameters b and S are called population-level parameters.
Following Train (2009) we use Gibbs sampling to estimate three sets of parameters










Draws from this posterior are obtained through conditional posteriors using Gibbs
sampling. The steps are as follows: (1) we take a draw of b conditional on values of
S and βn, (2) we take a draw of S conditional on values of b and βn, and (3) we take a
draw of βn conditional on values of b and S. Finally, these steps are repeated for many
iterations. In step 3, since we do not know the shape of the conditional posterior, the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to draw from distribution. In steps 1 and 2,
Gibbs sampling is used to draw from these posteriors. Gibbs sampling for this model
is fast and efficient because there are no layers that require numerical integration. In
fact, the first layer utilises a product of logit formulas for a given value of βn. Steps 1
and 2 do not utilise the data at all, because they depend only on the draws of βn.
The parameter estimates from both the maximum simulated likelihood and Baye-
sian approaches to estimating mixed logit models provide little economic information
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given the non-cardinal nature of utility. We use the estimated parameters to obtain
willingness to pay (WTP) measures. WTP is calculated as the change in price or pre-
mium in order to keep the same level of utility after an attribute (nominal) changes.




where βk is the estimated parameter of the kth attribute, and βp is the estimated coeffi-
cient of price or premium in our context. Following Lusk et al. (2003) the WTP mea-
sure is harmlessly multiplied by two due to our use of effects coding. Being the ratio
of two distributions the attribute WTP may be undefined or may not be amenable to
interpretation. In our estimation of the mixed logit model, we specify the premium
coefficient to be fixed (homogeneous across observations) and allow the coefficients of
other attributes to vary normally, a common assumption in many mixed logit applica-
tions (Hole, 2007; Ward et al., 2014). The specification of the fixed premium coeffi-
cient allows the distribution of the attribute WTP to be the same as the distribution of
the random attribute coefficient, with mean and variance scaled by the fixed premium
coefficient providing a meaningful interpretation (Revelt and Train, 1998; Ward et al.,
2014).
4. Data and Results
The interviewed households in the choice experiment took part in a long household
survey a year before the choice experiment. The household survey was conducted
through computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) under a multi-year impact
evaluation of RCC. Although the project impact evaluation plan is not germane to
this study, we used the household survey data to obtain socio-economic data of the
households. The sample for the household survey was randomly selected from 13
locations in 5 sub-counties (Matungulu, Kangundo, Kathiani, Mwala, Yatta). In each
location, 6 villages were randomly selected and ultimately 15 households from a list of
families in a village were selected. The household survey collected information on var-
ious socioeconomic variables such as demography, agricultural land characteristics,
production and inputs, livestock ownership, and credit. The household survey data
were collected from 1,170 households, all of them received training on RCC in
September 2017. The choice experiment data was collected from 330 households ran-
domly selected from these 1,170 households as explained in Figure 1. Table S1 shows
the locational distribution of our CE households.
Key socio-economic variables from the CE sample (330) are provided in Table 2, as
well as households that received any loan through the project. Compared to house-
holds with no loan, households who received a loan the previous year exhibited higher
maize yield and crop revenue per acre,5 and a higher number of working-age labour-
ers in the household but the lower percentage of households that are headed by a
5We calculate crop revenue per acre using three main crops grown in the area (maize, beans and
cowpeas). We take the average market prices for those three crops in Machakos area (the aver-
age price per kilogram of maize, beans and cowpeas were 43 Ksh, 90 Ksh and 109 Ksh, respec-
tively) and combine these with crop production and crop area data to calculate crop revenue
per acre.
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female. We use some of these variables as interaction terms in the estimation of our
choice models.
The choice data were collected from 330 farmers and 39 managers from key insur-
ance companies and banks in Kenya. Farmers were randomly assigned to a block of
choice sets and shown each choice set in that block, one set at a time. The 39 supply-
side financial institution participants represented both urban (20) and rural (19)
branches covering 22 managers from banks and 17 managers from insurance compa-
nies. Because each manager had to choose from nine different choice cards with three
alternatives to choose from in each card, the total number of rows was 39 * 9 * 3 or
1,053. Respondents’ household ID, random block number and the choice indicator
for the choice they made for each choice set were recorded. All responses were col-
lected using CAPI. We treat the premium of insurance as a continuous variable in the
regression. This reduces the number of parameters needed to be estimated and allows
for the calculation of willingness to pay.
Table 3 presents estimation results from the maximum simulated likelihood of
mixed logit model (presented in equation 4), without interaction terms, for both
demand and supply sides.6 The significance of standard deviation coefficients shows
Table 2
Socio-economic characteristics of sample households
Household (HH)
characteristics HH received loan HH with no loan Total
Yield of maize (kg/acre) 317.61*** 224.52*** 245.78
Crop revenue (KES/acre) 11,185.07* 9,214.70* 9,664.68
Household size 5.47 5.42 5.43
Female headed household 0.17** 0.23** 0.21
Age of the head 55.79 56.71 56.5
Max years of education in the
household
11.24 11.03 11.08
No. of working age labour 3.43** 3.20** 3.26
Total land size (acre) 3.98 4.02 4.01
Tropical livestock units: total 4.12 11.55 9.85
Distance from the HH to the
closest plot
1.07 1.05 1.06
Average travel time to seed
supplier (minutes and one
way)
29.46 30.75 30.45
*Significant at 10% indicate difference in means between sub-samples.
**Significant at 5% indicate difference in means between sub-samples.
***Significant at 1% indicate difference in means between sub-samples.
6The mixed logit models are estimated in Stata using the mixlogit command (Hole, 2007).
Although we report only the mixed logit results, we also estimated the conditional logit model,
presented in equation (2) and found almost similar mean parameter estimates. In addition, at
the request of the reviewer and the editor, we estimated the mixed logit model in WTP space. In
Table S2 in the Appendix S1, we provide the demand side estimation results in WTP space and
found the results to be very similar to the results presented in Table 3. WTP space estimation in
the supply side, however, did not converge.
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that there is significant preference heterogeneity for most of the attributes, confirmed
by the likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the standard deviations
(Table 3), which justifies the use of a mixed logit model. For the demand side, except
for insured risk coverage (low coverage), all other parameters are statistically signifi-
cant with expected signs. Although the coefficient for premium is very low, it is nega-
tive, meaning farmers are price sensitive and prefer a lower premium price, holding
Table 3
Maximum simulated likelihood of mixed logit without interaction
Variables
Demand side Supply side
Estimate Std error Estimate Std error
Mean coefficient
Insurance payment [Pay premium
separately]
−0.21*** 0.08 −1.29*** 0.34
Insured risk coverage [High coverage] 0.22*** 0.08 0.27 0.36
Insured risk coverage [Low coverage] −0.03 0.09 −0.56 0.29
Credit term [Long] 1.07*** 0.10 −1.06*** 0.31
Credit term [Medium] 0.92*** 0.10 −0.11 0.25
Collateral requirement [Full collateral] −0.50*** 0.11 −0.19 0.37
Collateral requirement [No collateral] 0.38*** 0.09 −0.84*** 0.35
Loan repayment flexibility [Monthly
repayment]
−0.51*** 0.12 −0.53* 0.33
Loan use flexibility [For agricultural
production]
−0.46*** 0.10 0.99*** 0.29
Preferred season [Both] 1.22*** 0.10 0.92*** 0.30
Preferred season [Long rain] 0.66*** 0.10 0.33 0.32
Rainfall measurement [Shortage at stages of
crop growth]
0.23*** 0.08 0.56* 0.32
Premium −0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard deviation coefficient
Insurance payment [Pay premium
separately]
0.55*** 0.15 0.77 0.49
Insured risk coverage [High coverage] 0.03 0.32 1.27*** 0.40
Insured risk coverage [Low coverage] 0.41** 0.19 0.31 0.96
Credit term [Long] 0.39** 0.20 0.19 0.64
Credit term [Medium] 0.45*** 0.17 0.33 0.53
Collateral requirement [Full collateral] 0.84*** 0.14 1.47*** 0.42
Collateral requirement [No collateral] 0.75*** 0.12 0.82* 0.47
Loan repayment flexibility [Monthly
repayment]
1.58*** 0.14 1.28*** 0.48
Loan use flexibility [For agricultural
production]
1.16*** 0.13 0.50 0.45
Preferred season [Both] 0.65*** 0.13 0.96** 0.40
Preferred season [Long rain] 0.48*** 0.17 0.71 0.59
Rainfall measurement [Shortage at stages of
crop growth]
0.50*** 0.16 1.30*** 0.44
Number of Halton draws 500 500
Simulated log-likelihood −2,732.19 −317.78
LR chi2 251.78 35.71
Number of rows 8,694 1,053
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other attributes constant, but the preferences are highly inelastic. Farmers have high
negative preferences for full collateral over partial collateral, and they mostly prefer
no collateral, as might be expected. In terms of loan repayment, farmers prefer to
repay after harvest, with a strong negative preference for repaying the loan monthly.
Farmers prefer to use the loan for any purpose rather than using only for agricultural
production. They also prefer to receive the credit in both long and short rain seasons
and their preferred term of credit is long or medium term.
On the other hand, the ‘supply’ side preferences for some attributes are different, as
one would expect. The premium does not seem to be a relevant attribute for managers
of financial institutions. Managers do not seem to prefer zero collateral at all, and
they prefer short-term credit over long- and medium-term credit. Managers strongly
prefer loans to be used only for agricultural production purposes. These results sug-
gest that there are conflicting demand- and supply-side preferences for credit term,
collateral requirement and loan use flexibility. These are expected in any lender-bor-
rower relationship. Lenders will prefer a shorter-term loan to reduce loan default
while farmers prefer longer terms to smooth liquidity; lenders require collateral to
secure the loan, while farmers (particularly those that are risk rationed, see Ndegwa
et al., 2020) are less willing to put collateral at risk; and lenders would prefer a loan
for specific uses that provide a return to capital, while farmers prefer greater fungibil-
ity in loan purpose. Loans offered in both long and short seasons are preferred for
both demand- and supply-side stakeholders.
Table 4 presents estimation results from the maximum simulated likelihood of a
mixed logit model with interaction terms, for both demand and supply sides. Similar
to the findings from Table 3, we see that the preferences for demand and supply sides
are congruent for an insurance payment option, loan repayment flexibility, and pre-
ferred season whereas they are conflicting for credit terms and loan use flexibility. We
notice that farmers who received loans in the previous season prefer the loan to be
used only for agricultural production purposes, aligned with suppliers’ preferences.
Female farmers prefer monthly loan repayment compared to male farmers although
an average farmer and a supplier do not prefer loans to be repaid monthly. Compared
to managers from insurance companies, bank managers do not prefer credit disburse-
ment in both seasons. It is also evident that managers from banks have more negative
preferences compared to their insurance company counterparts on making loans with-
out any collateral. Clearly, there is some heterogeneity about the preference for RCC
attributes among male and female-headed households. Similarly, we notice some
heterogeneity among insurance and bank company managers on their preference for
RCC attributes.
The results of Hierarchical Bayes estimation of the mixed logit model represented
by equation (4) are reported in Table S3. For analysing choice experiments in agricul-
tural economics, Hierarchical Bayes estimation is rarely used. For both demand and
supply sides, we report posterior means, posterior standard deviations and subject-
level standard deviations. The standard deviation of the posterior distribution in
Bayesian estimation is analogous to the standard error in the frequentist concept and,
accordingly, the level of significance was determined. The posterior mean values rep-
resent marginal utility parameters that provide relative values associated with each
attribute level. On the demand side, the Bayesian estimates of all attributes are similar
to the results obtained in Table 4, except the insurance payment which has now
become insignificant. On the supply side, the Bayesian estimation results are similar to
the results obtained in Table 4, except the credit term and collateral requirements
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Table 4
Maximum simulated likelihood of mixed logit with interaction terms
Variables
Demand side Supply side
Estimate Std error Estimate Std error
Mean coefficient
Insurance payment [Pay premium separately] −0.24** 0.10 −1.09*** 0.49
Insured risk coverage [High coverage] 0.29*** 0.10 −0.01 0.63
Insured risk coverage [Low coverage] −0.07 0.11 −0.24 0.43
Credit term [Long] 1.18*** 0.13 −0.46 0.43
Credit term [Medium] 1.00*** 0.13 0.10 0.41
Collateral requirement [Full collateral] −0.52*** 0.13 −0.27 0.61
Collateral requirement [No collateral] 0.39*** 0.11 0.41 0.40
Loan repayment flexibility [Monthly repayment] −0.70*** 0.14 −1.34*** 0.53
Loan use flexibility [For agricultural production] −0.56*** 0.13 1.24*** 0.46
Preferred season [Both] 1.11*** 0.12 1.72*** 0.48
Preferred season [Long rain] 0.69*** 0.13 −0.11 0.58
Rainfall measurement [Shortage at stages of crop
growth]
0.21** 0.10 0.26 0.64
Premium −0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
loan category [Loan] * Loan use flexibility [For
agricultural production]
0.49** 0.22
loan category [Loan] * Preferred season [Both] 0.37* 0.21
hh_female [1] * Collateral requirement [No
collateral]
0.57** 0.25
hh_female [1] * Loan repayment flexibility
[Monthly repayment]
1.35*** 0.34
Institution type [Bank] * Collateral requirement
[No collateral]
−2.04*** 0.58
Institution type [Bank] * Preferred season [Both] −1.11** 0.57
Standard deviation coefficient
Insurance payment [Pay premium separately] 0.52*** 0.15 0.98*** 0.51
Insured risk coverage [High coverage] 0.08 0.29 1.31*** 0.39
Insured risk coverage [Low coverage] 0.33 0.24 0.06 1.16
Credit term [Long] 0.43** 0.17 0.22 0.46
Credit term [Medium] 0.49*** 0.15 0.03 0.49
Collateral requirement [Full collateral] 0.85*** 0.14 1.39*** 0.41
Collateral requirement [No collateral] 0.72*** 0.13 0.18 0.59
Loan repayment flexibility [Monthly repayment] 1.49*** 0.14 1.20*** 0.45
Loan use flexibility [For agricultural production] 1.13*** 0.13 0.18 0.56
Preferred season [Both] 0.63*** 0.13 0.20 0.46
Preferred season [Long rain] 0.51*** 0.16 0.70*** 0.28
Rainfall measurement [Shortage at stages of crop
growth]
0.47*** 0.18 1.56*** 0.46
Number of Halton draws 500 500
Simulated log-likelihood −2,707.37 −300.92
LR chi2 234.28 35.83
Number of rows 8,694 1,053
Notes: The interaction terms are specified to be fixed in the mixed logit estimation. Among the
interaction terms, only the terms with significant coefficients are presented in the table.
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which have now become significant. The estimates of the interaction terms provide
similar results – male farmers strongly dislike monthly repayment compared to female
farmers. Interestingly, farmers who received loans in 2017 prefer loans to be repaid
monthly compared to farmers who did not receive loans in 2017.7 Compared to insur-
ance companies, banks do not like offering loans in both seasons. In terms of no-col-
lateral loans, banks have more negative preferences compared to insurance
companies.
We estimate the mean willingness to pay (WTP) along with their 95% confidence
intervals derived from the maximum simulated likelihood estimates of a mixed logit
model with interaction terms for both demand and supply sides. To keep the con-
sumer just as well off, a trade-off between increasing one discrete attribute from 0 to 1
and increasing the price (premium), gives the WTP for that attribute. Table 5 sum-
marises the calculated WTP and WTO for changes in particular attributes of the RCC
product. The numeraire in the insurance premium is measured in Kenyan shillings
(KSH).
For example, an average farmer is willing to pay 885 KSH less for a premium to be
paid separately compared to adding the premium with loans. Similarly, a finance pro-
vider would be willing to value 2,787 KSH less for the option of paying the premium
separately compared to adding the premium with a loan option although confidential
limits indicate the mean WTO estimate is not significantly different from zero. Farm-
ers’ WTP decreases by 2,036 KSH if loans can be used only for agricultural purposes
compared to loans to be used for any purpose, whereas finance providers’ WTO
increases by 3,180 KSH if loans are used only for agricultural production, although
according to the confidence limits the mean estimate is not significantly different from
zero. From Table 5, we see that WTP-WTO (credit demand and credit supply) are
conflicting for credit terms and loan use flexibility whereas WTP-WTO is congruent
for an insurance payment option, loan repayment flexibility, and preferred season.
The table also shows on demand side the WTP for farmers increases if RCC is avail-
able for both seasons compared to long or short rain season. The mean WTO from
supply side also increases on average if RCC is available for both seasons although
the confidential limits indicate the mean WTO estimate is not significantly different
from zero. This finding is consistent with the historical drought occurrence that hap-
pened almost evenly in both seasons. It is also indicative of credit demand in both
seasons.
5. Concluding Comments
Efforts to address weather-related risks and limited access to credit in smallholder
agriculture have resulted in the promotion of index insurance-linked credit products
in developing countries. Although bundling insurance with credit is a win-win propo-
sition, questions remain as to whether the attributes of this innovative bundled pro-
duct can meet the demand for smallholder farmers and whether financial institutions
7In the 2017 RCT one third of farmers were offered traditional loans, one third offered risk-con-
tingent credit loans, and one third – used as a control – were not offered a loan at all. Whether a
traditional or RCC loan was offered, or no loan offered was randomly determined by drawing a
chit from an urn. About 63% of farmers offered either loan type, did not accept the loan. Our
random draw of participants for the choice experiment described in this paper was independent
of 2017 loan status.
 2020 The Authors. Journal of Agricultural Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Agricultural Economics Society
Heterogeneous demand and supply for RCC 19
will be willing to offer them, and also about the optimal packaging of insurance and
credit components that will meet the preferences of both demand and supply sides.
We use a discrete choice experiment to examine demand and supply-side prefer-
ences for attributes of insurance-linked credit in Kenya, and model heterogeneity in
these preferences using primary data from smallholder farmers and managers of
financial institutions combined with household socio-economic survey data. We anal-
yse the choice data using maximum simulated likelihood and Hierarchical Bayes esti-
mation of the mixed logit model. Our research provides a novel approach of
comparing demand and supply-side preferences to examine gaps in expectations from
both sides of a potential risk-contingent credit market.
We find that farmers prefer credit for both seasons (long and short rains), credit
terms to be one year or longer, no or partial collateral for loan, lower risk premium,
high insured risk coverage, and loans to be used for any purpose. Supply-side results
suggest that managers of financial institutions prefer the risk premium to be added
with the loan amount, loans to be repaid after harvest, credit available for both sea-
sons, loans to be used only for agricultural purpose, and bank managers preferred
loans to be fully or partially collateralised. Overall, there are conflicting demand and
supply-side preferences for credit term, loan use flexibility, and collateral requirement.
While long-term loans are preferred by farmers, they are not preferred by finance pro-
viders. Farmers prefer medium-term credit over short-term credit although suppliers
do not prefer either. Farmers prefer loans to be used for any purpose, but the man-
agers tend to prefer loans to be used only for agricultural production purposes, as an
investment in productive activities is perceived to enhance the probability of loan
repayment. No-collateral loans are preferred by farmers whereas they are not pre-
ferred by bank managers.
We also analyse willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to offer (WTO) for farm-
ers and suppliers, respectively. WTP-WTO levels are most conflicting between
demand and supply sides for credit term and loan use flexibility whereas WTP-WTO
are congruent for an insurance payment option, loan repayment flexibility and pre-
ferred season. In terms of collateral requirement, farmers’ WTP increases whereas
bank managers’ WTO decreases if the credit is collateral-free compared to a full col-
lateral loan. Since the WTP-WTO for partial collateral increases for both farmers and
bank managers, our results suggest development of a partial collateral contract for
risk-contingent credit.
If risk-contingent credit is to be scaled up, our recommendation is to develop and
market a partial collateral RCC contract, insurance premium to be added with loans,
loans to be repaid after harvest, and loans to be offered in both long- and short-rain
seasons. Identifying the preferred attributes and levels for both farmers and financial
institutions can guide the optimal packaging of insurance and credit providing market
participation and adoption motivation for insurance-bundled credit products. Our
findings can complement actuarial design and ratemaking.
Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Informa-
tion section at the end of the article.
Supplementary Material. On-Line Appendix.
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Liesivaara, P. and Myyrä, S. ‘Willingness to pay for agricultural crop insurance in the northern
EU’, Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 74, (2014) pp. 539–554.
Lusk, J. L., Norwood, F. B. and Pruitt, J. R. ‘Consumer demand for a ban on antibiotic drug
use in pork production’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 88, (2006) pp.
1015–1033.
Lusk, J. L., Roosen, J. and Fox, J. ‘Demand for beef from cattle administered growth hormones
or fed genetically modified corn: A comparison of consumers in France, Germany, the United
 2020 The Authors. Journal of Agricultural Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Agricultural Economics Society
22 Apurba Shee, Calum G. Turvey and Ana Marr
Kingdom, and the United States’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 85,
(2003) pp. 16–29.
Lusk, J. L. and Schroeder, T. C. ‘Are choice experiments incentive compatible? A test with
quality differentiated beef steaks’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 86,
(2004) pp. 467–482.
Marr, A., Winkel, A., van Asseldonk, M., Lensink, R. and Bulte, E. ‘Adoption and impact of
index-insurance and credit for smallholder farmers in developing countries: A systematic
review’, Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 76, (2016) pp. 94–118.
McFadden, D. ‘Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior’, in P. Zarembka (ed.),
Frontiers in Econometrics (New York: Academic Publishing, 1974, pp. 105–142).
McFadden, D. and Train, K. ‘Mixed MNL models for discrete response’, Journal of Applied
Econometrics, Vol. 15, (2000) pp. 447–470.
Miranda, M. J. and Farrin, K. ‘Index insurance for developing countries’, Applied Economic
Perspectives and Policy, Vol. 34, (2012) pp. 391–427.
Miranda, M. J. and Gonzalez-Vega, C. ‘Systemic risk, index insurance, and optimal manage-
ment of agricultural loan portfolios in developing countries’, American Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics, Vol. 93, (2011) pp. 399–406.
Ndegwa, M. K., Shee, A., Turvey, C. G. and You, L. ‘Uptake of insurance-embedded credit in
presence of credit rationing: Evidence from a randomized controlled trial in Kenya’, Agricul-
tural Finance Review, (2020). [Epub ahead of print]. https://doi.org/10.1108/AFR-10-2019-
0116
Orme, B. Sample size issues for conjoint analysis studies. (Sawtooth Software Technical Paper,
Sequim, 1998).
Ortega, D. L., Wang, H. H., Wu, L., Olynk, N. and Bai, J. ‘Chinese consumers’ demand for
food safety attributes: A push for government and industry regulations’, American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 94, (2012) pp. 489–495.
Ready, R. C., Champ, P. A. and Lawton, J. L. ‘Using respondent uncertainty to mitigate hypo-
thetical bias in a stated choice experiment’, Land Economics, Vol. 86, (2010) pp. 363–381.
Revelt, D. and Train, K. ‘Mixed Logit with repeated choices: Households’ choices and appli-
ance efficiency level’, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 80, (1998) pp. 647–657.
Rose, J. M. and Bliemer, M. C. J. ‘Sample size requirements for stated choice experiments’,
Transportation, Vol. 40, (2013) pp. 1021–1041.
Santos, P. and Barrett, C. B. ‘Heterogeneous wealth dynamics: On the roles of risk and ability’,
in C. B. Barrett, M. R. Carter and J.-P. Chavas (eds.), The Economics of Poverty Traps (Chi-
cago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2019, pp. 265–290).
Shee, A. and Turvey, C. G. ‘Collateral-free lending with risk-contingent credit for agricultural
development: Indemnifying loans against pulse crop price risk in India’, Agricultural Eco-
nomics, Vol. 43, (2012) pp. 561–574.
Shee, A., Turvey, C. G. and Woodard, J. D. ‘A field study for assessing risk-contingent credit
for Kenyan pastoralists and dairy farmers’, Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 75, (2015) pp.
330–348.
Shee, A., Turvey, C. G. and You, L. ‘Design and rating of risk-contingent credit for balancing
business and financial risks for Kenyan farmers’, Applied Economics, Vol. 51, (2019) pp.
5447–5465.
Skees, J. R. and Barnett, B. J. ‘Enhancing microfinance using index-based risk-transfer prod-
ucts’, Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 66, (2006) pp. 235–250.
Skees, J. R., Hartell, J. and Murphy, A. G. ‘Using index-based risk transfer products to facili-
tate micro lending in Peru and Vietnam’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.
89, (2007) pp. 1255–1261.
Train, K. E. Discrete Choice Models with Simulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009).
 2020 The Authors. Journal of Agricultural Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Agricultural Economics Society
Heterogeneous demand and supply for RCC 23
Train, K. E. and Sonnier, G. ‘Mixed logit with bounded distributions of correlated partworths’,
in A. Alberini and R. Scarpa (eds.), Applications of Simulation Methods in Environmental and
Resource Economics (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005, pp. 117–134).
Turvey, C. G., He, G., Ma, J., Kong, R. and Meagher, P. ‘Farm credit and credit demand elas-
ticities in Shaanxi and Gansu’, China Economic Review, Vol. 23, (2012) pp. 1020–1035.
Turvey, C. G., Shee, A. and Marr, A. ‘Addressing fractional dimensionality in the application
of weather index insurance and climate risk financing in agricultural development: A dynamic
triggering approach’,Weather, Climate, and Society, Vol. 11, (2019) pp. 901–915.
Veldwijk, J., Lambooij, M. S., de Bekker-Grob, E. W., Smit, H. A. and de Wit, G. A. ‘The
effect of including an opt-out option in discrete choice experiments’, PLoS One, Vol. 9(11),
(2014) p#. e111805.
Verteramo-Chiu, L. J., Khantachavana, S. V. and Turvey, C. G. ‘Risk rationing and the
demand for agricultural credit: A comparative investigation of Mexico and China’, Agricul-
tural Finance Review, Vol. 74, (2014) pp. 248–270.
Wang, H. H., Hanson, S. D., Myers, R. and Black, J. R. ‘The effects of crop yield insurance
designs and farmer participation and welfare’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Vol. 80, (1998) pp. 806–820.
Ward, P. S., Bell, A. R., Parkhurst, G. M., Droppelmann, K. and Mapemba, L. ‘Heterogeneous
preferences and the effects of incentives in promoting conservation agriculture in Malawi’,
Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment, Vol. 222, (2016) pp. 67–79.
Ward, P. S. and Makhija, S. ‘New modalities for managing drought risk in rainfed agriculture:
Evidence from a discrete choice experiment in Odisha, India’, World Development, Vol. 107,
(2018) pp. 163–175.
Ward, P. S., Ortega, D., Spielman, D. J. and Singh, V. ‘Heterogenous demand for drought-tol-
erant rice: Evidence from Bihar, India’, World Deveopment, Vol. 64, (2014) pp. 125–139.
Weber, R. and Mußhoff, O. ‘Can flexible microfinance loans improve credit access for farm-
ers?’, Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 73, (2013) pp. 255–271.
Yu, J., Goos, P. P. and Vandebroek, M. ‘Efficient conjoint choice designs in the presence of
respondent heterogeneity’, Marketing Science, Vol. 28, (2009) pp. 122–135.
 2020 The Authors. Journal of Agricultural Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Agricultural Economics Society
24 Apurba Shee, Calum G. Turvey and Ana Marr
